Keyword: Copyright

The Interplay between the Digital Services Act and Sector Regulation: How Special is Copyright? external link

Quintais, J. & Schwemer, S.
European Journal of Risk Regulation, vol. 13, iss. : 2, pp: 191-217, 2022

Abstract

On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the 21-year- old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services. Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this paper, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in art. 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the DSA will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by art. 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where art. 17 leaves margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the DSA relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where art. 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter. From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the DSA aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might be help achieve that goal.

Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Content moderation, Copyright, Digital services act, frontpage, Online platforms

Bibtex

Article{Quintais2021e, title = {The Interplay between the Digital Services Act and Sector Regulation: How Special is Copyright?}, author = {Quintais, J. and Schwemer, S.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/ejrr_2022/}, doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2022.1}, year = {0314}, date = {2022-03-14}, journal = {European Journal of Risk Regulation}, volume = {13}, issue = {2}, pages = {191-217}, abstract = {On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the 21-year- old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services. Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this paper, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in art. 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the DSA will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by art. 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where art. 17 leaves margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the DSA relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where art. 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter. From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the DSA aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might be help achieve that goal.}, keywords = {Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Content moderation, Copyright, Digital services act, frontpage, Online platforms}, }

Too Small to Matter? On the Copyright Directive’s bias in favour of big right-holders external link

Husovec, M. & Quintais, J.
Oxford University Press, 0429

Abstract

Copyright law is about recognising the author’s material and non-material interests and setting the incentives for creativity right. The legislative changes in this area increasingly look as if simple linearity governs the world: what we take away from some, we automatically give away in equal part to others. The idea of redistribution is noticeable in recent legislative developments. Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive) is the latest policy intervention to prove this point. According to its logic, imposing stricter liability on some online gatekeepers will automatically improve the position and revenues for all right-holders. This chapter explores the flaws in such an approach by highlighting how the excessive focus of Art. 17 on big right-holders neglects and harms smaller creators. EU copyright law often uses a technical term of ‘right-holders’ to refer to a wide range of players with legal entitlements in the copyright ecosystem: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers, broadcasting organisations and (most recently) press publishers. Obviously, not all right-holders are created equal nor do their legal entitlements flow from identical normative justifications. We argue in this chapter that even the use of this seemingly neutral term can, due to the design of underlying legal solutions, lead to stark inequality between right-holders. Our broader goal is to demonstrate that maximising enforcement by means of Art. 17 of the DSM Directive does not simply maximise the position of every right-holder at the expense of platforms but does so disproportionality for big right-holders. Besides, we show that blind use of ‘right-holder’ and ‘user’ distinction harms the very creators that provision is supposed to protect.

Article 17, Copyright, equal treatment, frontpage, online platform

Bibtex

Chapter{HusovecQuintais2021-2, title = {Too Small to Matter? On the Copyright Directive’s bias in favour of big right-holders}, author = {Husovec, M. and Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3835930}, year = {0429}, date = {2021-04-29}, abstract = {Copyright law is about recognising the author’s material and non-material interests and setting the incentives for creativity right. The legislative changes in this area increasingly look as if simple linearity governs the world: what we take away from some, we automatically give away in equal part to others. The idea of redistribution is noticeable in recent legislative developments. Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive) is the latest policy intervention to prove this point. According to its logic, imposing stricter liability on some online gatekeepers will automatically improve the position and revenues for all right-holders. This chapter explores the flaws in such an approach by highlighting how the excessive focus of Art. 17 on big right-holders neglects and harms smaller creators. EU copyright law often uses a technical term of ‘right-holders’ to refer to a wide range of players with legal entitlements in the copyright ecosystem: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers, broadcasting organisations and (most recently) press publishers. Obviously, not all right-holders are created equal nor do their legal entitlements flow from identical normative justifications. We argue in this chapter that even the use of this seemingly neutral term can, due to the design of underlying legal solutions, lead to stark inequality between right-holders. Our broader goal is to demonstrate that maximising enforcement by means of Art. 17 of the DSM Directive does not simply maximise the position of every right-holder at the expense of platforms but does so disproportionality for big right-holders. Besides, we show that blind use of ‘right-holder’ and ‘user’ distinction harms the very creators that provision is supposed to protect.}, keywords = {Article 17, Copyright, equal treatment, frontpage, online platform}, }

The Rise of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the Role of Copyright Law – Part II external link

Quintais, J., Bodó, B., Giannopoulou, A. & Mezei, P.
2021

blockchain, Copyright, frontpage, NFT

Bibtex

Online publication{Quintais2021c, title = {The Rise of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the Role of Copyright Law – Part II}, author = {Quintais, J. and Bodó, B. and Giannopoulou, A. and Mezei, P.}, url = {http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/04/22/the-rise-of-non-fungible-tokens-nfts-and-the-role-of-copyright-law-part-ii/}, year = {0422}, date = {2021-04-22}, keywords = {blockchain, Copyright, frontpage, NFT}, }

The Rise of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the Role of Copyright Law – Part I external link

Quintais, J., Bodó, B., Giannopoulou, A. & Mezei, P.
2021

blockchain, Copyright, frontpage

Bibtex

Online publication{QuintaisetalNFTPartI, title = {The Rise of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the Role of Copyright Law – Part I}, author = {Quintais, J. and Bodó, B. and Giannopoulou, A. and Mezei, P.}, url = {http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/04/14/the-rise-of-non-fungible-tokens-nfts-and-the-role-of-copyright-law-part-i/}, year = {0414}, date = {2021-04-14}, keywords = {blockchain, Copyright, frontpage}, }

The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights external link

Quintais, J. & Quintais, J.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 16, num: 3, pp: 213-225, 2021

Abstract

On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated. This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling. This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).

Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online

Bibtex

Article{QuintaisJutte2021, title = {The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3775599}, doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab040}, year = {0218}, date = {2021-02-18}, journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {213-225}, abstract = {On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated. This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling. This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).}, keywords = {Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online}, }

The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market external link

Senftleben, M. & Angelopoulos, C.
2020

Abstract

EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers. This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD'). With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.

algorithmic enforcement, Auteursrecht, censorship, Content moderation, Copyright, defamation, Digital services act, filtering, Freedom of expression, frontpage, general monitoring, hosting service, injunctive relief, intermediary liability, notice and stay down, notice and take down, safe harbour, trade mark, user-generated content

Bibtex

Report{Senftleben2020e, title = {The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market}, author = {Senftleben, M. and Angelopoulos, C.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717022}, year = {1029}, date = {2020-10-29}, abstract = {EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers. This requirement of \'double specificity\' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive (\'ECD\') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (\'CDSMD\'). With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.}, keywords = {algorithmic enforcement, Auteursrecht, censorship, Content moderation, Copyright, defamation, Digital services act, filtering, Freedom of expression, frontpage, general monitoring, hosting service, injunctive relief, intermediary liability, notice and stay down, notice and take down, safe harbour, trade mark, user-generated content}, }

Robot Creativity: An Incentive-Based Neighbouring Rights Approach external link

Senftleben, M. & Buijtelaar, L.D.
European Intellectual Property Review, vol. 42, num: 12, 2020

Abstract

Today texts, paintings and songs need no longer be the result of human creativity. Advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems are capable of generating creations that can hardly be distinguished from those of authors of flesh and blood. This development raises the question whether AI-generated works could be eligible for copyright protection. In the following analysis, we explore this question. After a discussion of the traditional copyright requirement of human creativity, the rationales underlying copyright protection – in particular the utilitarian incentive theory – will serve as a compass to decide on the grant of protection and delineate the scope of exclusive rights. In addition, the analysis will address the question who the owner of protected AI creations should be. Finally, the discussion of pros and cons of protection will be placed in the broader context of competing policy goals and legal obligations, such as the prospect of enriching the public domain and the question of liability for AI creations that infringe the rights of third parties.

Copyright, creativiteit, frontpage, Naburige rechten

Bibtex

Article{Senftleben2020d, title = {Robot Creativity: An Incentive-Based Neighbouring Rights Approach}, author = {Senftleben, M. and Buijtelaar, L.D.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3707741}, year = {1013}, date = {2020-10-13}, journal = {European Intellectual Property Review}, volume = {42}, number = {12}, pages = {}, abstract = {Today texts, paintings and songs need no longer be the result of human creativity. Advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems are capable of generating creations that can hardly be distinguished from those of authors of flesh and blood. This development raises the question whether AI-generated works could be eligible for copyright protection. In the following analysis, we explore this question. After a discussion of the traditional copyright requirement of human creativity, the rationales underlying copyright protection – in particular the utilitarian incentive theory – will serve as a compass to decide on the grant of protection and delineate the scope of exclusive rights. In addition, the analysis will address the question who the owner of protected AI creations should be. Finally, the discussion of pros and cons of protection will be placed in the broader context of competing policy goals and legal obligations, such as the prospect of enriching the public domain and the question of liability for AI creations that infringe the rights of third parties.}, keywords = {Copyright, creativiteit, frontpage, Naburige rechten}, }

How to License Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms external link

Husovec, M. & Quintais, J.
2020

Abstract

Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive is a major Internet policy experiment of our decade. The provision fundamentally changes copyright regulation of certain digital platforms. However, the precise nature of art. 17 is far from clear. How does it fit the existing structure of EU copyright law and doctrine? How can the Member States implement it? These are the questions at the heart of this article. To answer them, we start by examining the nature and structure of the right prescribed in art. 17. The exact qualification brings important legal consequences. Among others, it determines the conditions imposed by EU law and international law on national implementations. After reviewing different interpretation options, we conclude that art. 17 introduces either a special or a new sui generis right, both of which allow significant margin of discretion for Member States, especially as regards licensing mechanisms and exceptions. [This is a revised and updated version of a working paper first published in October 2019]

Article 17, communication to the public, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, frontpage, intermediaries, Licensing

Bibtex

Article{Husovec2020c, title = {How to License Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms}, author = {Husovec, M. and Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463011}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3463011}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-09-29}, abstract = {Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive is a major Internet policy experiment of our decade. The provision fundamentally changes copyright regulation of certain digital platforms. However, the precise nature of art. 17 is far from clear. How does it fit the existing structure of EU copyright law and doctrine? How can the Member States implement it? These are the questions at the heart of this article. To answer them, we start by examining the nature and structure of the right prescribed in art. 17. The exact qualification brings important legal consequences. Among others, it determines the conditions imposed by EU law and international law on national implementations. After reviewing different interpretation options, we conclude that art. 17 introduces either a special or a new sui generis right, both of which allow significant margin of discretion for Member States, especially as regards licensing mechanisms and exceptions. [This is a revised and updated version of a working paper first published in October 2019]}, keywords = {Article 17, communication to the public, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, frontpage, intermediaries, Licensing}, }

From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test external link

Senftleben, M.
0416

Abstract

In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.

access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement

Bibtex

Chapter{Senftleben2020b, title = {From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test}, author = {Senftleben, M.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576019}, year = {0416}, date = {2020-04-16}, abstract = {In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.}, keywords = {access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement}, }

Belgian court asks CJEU whether seeding is communicating to the public external link

Bouchè, G.
Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2020

aansprakelijkheid, Belgium, Copyright, EU, frontpage, handhaving, right of communication to the public

Bibtex

Article{Bouchè2020b, title = {Belgian court asks CJEU whether seeding is communicating to the public}, author = {Bouchè, G.}, url = {http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/03/30/belgian-court-asks-cjeu-whether-seeding-is-communicating-to-the-public/}, year = {0330}, date = {2020-03-30}, journal = {Kluwer Copyright Blog}, keywords = {aansprakelijkheid, Belgium, Copyright, EU, frontpage, handhaving, right of communication to the public}, }