Keyword: Freedom of expression

How the EU Outsources the Task of Human Rights Protection to Platforms and Users: The Case of UGC Monetization external link

Senftleben, M., Quintais, J. & Meiring, A.
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 38, iss. : 3, pp: 933-1010, 2024

Abstract

With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach. Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.

Artificial intelligence, Content moderation, Copyright, derivative works, discrimination, Freedom of expression, Human rights, liability, proportionality, user-generated content

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {How the EU Outsources the Task of Human Rights Protection to Platforms and Users: The Case of UGC Monetization}, author = {Senftleben, M. and Quintais, J. and Meiring, A.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4421150}, year = {2024}, date = {2024-01-23}, journal = {Berkeley Technology Law Journal}, volume = {38}, issue = {3}, pages = {933-1010}, abstract = {With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach. Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.}, keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Content moderation, Copyright, derivative works, discrimination, Freedom of expression, Human rights, liability, proportionality, user-generated content}, }

Generative AI and Author Remuneration

Senftleben, M.
IIC, vol. 54, pp: 1535-1560, 2023

Abstract

With the evolution of generative AI systems, machine-made productions in the literary and artistic field have reached a level of refinement that allows them to replace human creations. The increasing sophistication of AI systems will inevitably disrupt the market for human literary and artistic works. Generative AI systems provide literary and artistic output much faster and cheaper. It is therefore foreseeable that human authors will be exposed to substitution effects. They may lose income as they are replaced by machines in sectors ranging from journalism and writing to music and visual arts. Considering this trend, the question arises whether it is advisable to take measures to compensate human authors for the reduction in their market share and income. Copyright law could serve as a tool to introduce an AI levy system and ensure the payment of equitable remuneration. In combination with mandatory collective rights management, the new revenue stream could be used to finance social and cultural funds that improve the working and living conditions of flesh-and-blood authors.

collective rights management, Copyright, Freedom of expression, text and data mining, three-step test

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Generative AI and Author Remuneration}, author = {Senftleben, M.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-023-01399-4}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-11-07}, journal = {IIC}, volume = {54}, pages = {1535-1560}, abstract = {With the evolution of generative AI systems, machine-made productions in the literary and artistic field have reached a level of refinement that allows them to replace human creations. The increasing sophistication of AI systems will inevitably disrupt the market for human literary and artistic works. Generative AI systems provide literary and artistic output much faster and cheaper. It is therefore foreseeable that human authors will be exposed to substitution effects. They may lose income as they are replaced by machines in sectors ranging from journalism and writing to music and visual arts. Considering this trend, the question arises whether it is advisable to take measures to compensate human authors for the reduction in their market share and income. Copyright law could serve as a tool to introduce an AI levy system and ensure the payment of equitable remuneration. In combination with mandatory collective rights management, the new revenue stream could be used to finance social and cultural funds that improve the working and living conditions of flesh-and-blood authors.}, keywords = {collective rights management, Copyright, Freedom of expression, text and data mining, three-step test}, }

Designing a freedom of expression-compliant framework for moral rights in the EU: challenges and proposals

Geiger, C. & Izyumenko, E.
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Moral Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023, pp: 292–314, ISBN: 9781789904864

Abstract

In the discussions on copyright and freedom of expression, it is common to focus on copy-right’s economic rights and their potential to restrict the users’ freedom of artistic creativity, freedom to express criticism or freedom to receive and impart information. By contrast, moral rights of the authors (such as the right of divulgation, the right of attribution and the right of integrity) have been much less explored with regard to their potential conflict with creators’ and users’ freedom of expression. Without doubt, moral rights are at the core of copyright protection, in particular in systems following the so-called “civil law” tradition. Their protection represents an important interest that can claim fundamental rights foundations. On a more general level, moral rights can emanate from the need to protect the authors’ dignity and personality - the values underlying a number of fundamental rights in the human rights treaties. More specifically, certain scholars allocate the interest in the protection of the authors’ moral rights in the right to privacy and personal integrity, others - in the so-called “negative” aspect of the right to freedom of expression - the right not to speak and to be free from unwanted associations. Either one way or another, however, the interest of the author in the protection of her personality via moral rights should not be accorded absolute and hence unqualified protection. In particular, competing freedom of expression interests of users (including derivative creators) must not be neglected as a result of such protection. The argument of this chapter is that, despite a relative lack of attention towards the effects of moral rights on the freedom of expression of others, moral rights, if applied in an unlimited way, might impede users’ freedoms even to a greater extent than economic rights of copyright holders. The problem thus deserves further scrutiny and solutions need to be advanced to guarantee that uses of copyright-protected works that are essential for a democratic society are not unduly hindered by moral rights.

Freedom of expression, moral rights

Bibtex

Chapter{nokey, title = {Designing a freedom of expression-compliant framework for moral rights in the EU: challenges and proposals}, author = {Geiger, C. and Izyumenko, E.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789904871.00028}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-09-12}, abstract = {In the discussions on copyright and freedom of expression, it is common to focus on copy-right’s economic rights and their potential to restrict the users’ freedom of artistic creativity, freedom to express criticism or freedom to receive and impart information. By contrast, moral rights of the authors (such as the right of divulgation, the right of attribution and the right of integrity) have been much less explored with regard to their potential conflict with creators’ and users’ freedom of expression. Without doubt, moral rights are at the core of copyright protection, in particular in systems following the so-called “civil law” tradition. Their protection represents an important interest that can claim fundamental rights foundations. On a more general level, moral rights can emanate from the need to protect the authors’ dignity and personality - the values underlying a number of fundamental rights in the human rights treaties. More specifically, certain scholars allocate the interest in the protection of the authors’ moral rights in the right to privacy and personal integrity, others - in the so-called “negative” aspect of the right to freedom of expression - the right not to speak and to be free from unwanted associations. Either one way or another, however, the interest of the author in the protection of her personality via moral rights should not be accorded absolute and hence unqualified protection. In particular, competing freedom of expression interests of users (including derivative creators) must not be neglected as a result of such protection. The argument of this chapter is that, despite a relative lack of attention towards the effects of moral rights on the freedom of expression of others, moral rights, if applied in an unlimited way, might impede users’ freedoms even to a greater extent than economic rights of copyright holders. The problem thus deserves further scrutiny and solutions need to be advanced to guarantee that uses of copyright-protected works that are essential for a democratic society are not unduly hindered by moral rights.}, keywords = {Freedom of expression, moral rights}, }

Freedom of Expression as a Rationale for IP Protection

Izyumenko, E.
GRUR International, vol. 72, iss. : 9, pp: 840-852, 2023

Abstract

This article revisits the discussion on the rationales for intellectual property (IP) protection by addressing a particular justificatory theory for IP that had come to the forefront of legal discussions in recent years – the theory based on freedom of expression and information. This modern vision of IP focuses on the communicative nature of IP subject-matter and of IP as a legal regime. Firstly, this article reviews the Kantian theory of copyright that lies at the origins of any modern discussions on the communicative nature of IP regulation with the aim of answering whether IP should be more properly conceived as the system for regulating communication. It then looks at the readings of this theory by contemporary copyright scholars and considers applicability of the communicative theory to other areas of IP such as trademarks and patents. The analysis then proceeds towards looking at the freedom of expression dimension of the ‘classic’ IP theories. Reflecting on this matter is important as the rationales for IP protection influence virtually all spheres of IP’s legal regulation, including – first and foremost – the reach of IP holders’ entitlements.

Freedom of expression, Intellectual property

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Freedom of Expression as a Rationale for IP Protection}, author = {Izyumenko, E.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikad071}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-07-25}, journal = {GRUR International}, volume = {72}, issue = {9}, pages = {840-852}, abstract = {This article revisits the discussion on the rationales for intellectual property (IP) protection by addressing a particular justificatory theory for IP that had come to the forefront of legal discussions in recent years – the theory based on freedom of expression and information. This modern vision of IP focuses on the communicative nature of IP subject-matter and of IP as a legal regime. Firstly, this article reviews the Kantian theory of copyright that lies at the origins of any modern discussions on the communicative nature of IP regulation with the aim of answering whether IP should be more properly conceived as the system for regulating communication. It then looks at the readings of this theory by contemporary copyright scholars and considers applicability of the communicative theory to other areas of IP such as trademarks and patents. The analysis then proceeds towards looking at the freedom of expression dimension of the ‘classic’ IP theories. Reflecting on this matter is important as the rationales for IP protection influence virtually all spheres of IP’s legal regulation, including – first and foremost – the reach of IP holders’ entitlements.}, keywords = {Freedom of expression, Intellectual property}, }

Using Terms and Conditions to apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation

Quintais, J., Appelman, N. & Fahy, R.
German Law Journal, 2023

Abstract

Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.

Content moderation, Digital services act, Freedom of expression, Online platforms, platform regulation, terms and conditions

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Using Terms and Conditions to apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation}, author = {Quintais, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.53}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-07-11}, journal = {German Law Journal}, abstract = {Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.}, keywords = {Content moderation, Digital services act, Freedom of expression, Online platforms, platform regulation, terms and conditions}, }

Freedom of Expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights external link

McGonagle, T. & Voorhoof, D.
European Audiovisual Observatory, 2023, Strasbourg, Edition: 8th , ISBN: 9789287184351

Abstract

This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first seven editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2022) have proved hugely successful. The new seventh edition summarises over 378 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database).

Freedom of expression, Journalism, Media law

Bibtex

Book{nokey, title = {Freedom of Expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights}, author = {McGonagle, T. and Voorhoof, D.}, url = {https://rm.coe.int/iris-themes-vol-iii-8th-edition-april-2023-/1680ab1d11}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-04-24}, abstract = {This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first seven editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2022) have proved hugely successful. The new seventh edition summarises over 378 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court\'s online case-law database).}, keywords = {Freedom of expression, Journalism, Media law}, }

The right to encryption: Privacy as preventing unlawful access external link

van Daalen, O.
Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 49, 2023

Abstract

Encryption technologies are a fundamental building block of modern digital infrastructure, but plans to curb these technologies continue to spring up. Even in the European Union, where their application is by now firmly embedded in legislation, lawmakers are again calling for measures which would impact these technologies. One of the most important arguments in this debate are human rights, most notably the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression. And although some authors have in the past explored how encryption technologies support human rights, this connection is not yet firmly grounded in an analysis of European human rights case law. This contribution aims to fill this gap, developing a framework for assessing restrictions of encryption technologies under the rights to privacy and freedom of expression as protected under the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention) and the Charter of Fundamental rights in the European Union (the Charter). In the first section, the relevant function of encryption technologies, restricting access to information (called confidentiality), is discussed. In the second section, an overview of some governmental policies and practices impacting these technologies is provided. This continues with a discussion of the case law on the rights to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, arguing that these rights are not only about ensuring lawful access by governments to protected information, but also about preventing unlawful access by others. And because encryption technologies are an important technology to reduce the risk of this unlawful access, it is then proposed that this risk is central to the assessment of governance measures in the field of encryption technologies. The article concludes by recommending that states perform an in-depth assessement of this when proposing new measures, and that courts when reviewing them also place the risk of unlawful access central to the analysis of interference and proportionality.

communications confidentiality, encryption, Freedom of expression, Human rights, Privacy, unlawful access

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {The right to encryption: Privacy as preventing unlawful access}, author = {van Daalen, O.}, url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364923000146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2023.105804}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-05-23}, journal = {Computer Law & Security Review}, volume = {49}, pages = {}, abstract = {Encryption technologies are a fundamental building block of modern digital infrastructure, but plans to curb these technologies continue to spring up. Even in the European Union, where their application is by now firmly embedded in legislation, lawmakers are again calling for measures which would impact these technologies. One of the most important arguments in this debate are human rights, most notably the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression. And although some authors have in the past explored how encryption technologies support human rights, this connection is not yet firmly grounded in an analysis of European human rights case law. This contribution aims to fill this gap, developing a framework for assessing restrictions of encryption technologies under the rights to privacy and freedom of expression as protected under the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention) and the Charter of Fundamental rights in the European Union (the Charter). In the first section, the relevant function of encryption technologies, restricting access to information (called confidentiality), is discussed. In the second section, an overview of some governmental policies and practices impacting these technologies is provided. This continues with a discussion of the case law on the rights to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, arguing that these rights are not only about ensuring lawful access by governments to protected information, but also about preventing unlawful access by others. And because encryption technologies are an important technology to reduce the risk of this unlawful access, it is then proposed that this risk is central to the assessment of governance measures in the field of encryption technologies. The article concludes by recommending that states perform an in-depth assessement of this when proposing new measures, and that courts when reviewing them also place the risk of unlawful access central to the analysis of interference and proportionality.}, keywords = {communications confidentiality, encryption, Freedom of expression, Human rights, Privacy, unlawful access}, }

Fundamental rights assessment of the framework for detection orders under the CSAM proposal download

van Daalen, O.
2023

CSAM, Data protection, Freedom of expression, Privacy

Bibtex

Report{nokey, title = {Fundamental rights assessment of the framework for detection orders under the CSAM proposal}, author = {van Daalen, O.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publications/fundamental-rights-assessment-of-the-framework-for-detection-orders-under-the-csam-proposal/csamreport/}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-04-22}, keywords = {CSAM, Data protection, Freedom of expression, Privacy}, }

Outsourcing Human Rights Obligations and Concealing Human Rights Deficits: The Example of Monetizing User-Generated Content Under the CDSM Directive and the Digital Services Act external link

Senftleben, M., Quintais, J. & Meiring, A.

Abstract

With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach. Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.

Artificial intelligence, Content moderation, Copyright, derivative works, discrimination, Freedom of expression, Human rights, liability, user-generated content

Bibtex

Online publication{nokey, title = {Outsourcing Human Rights Obligations and Concealing Human Rights Deficits: The Example of Monetizing User-Generated Content Under the CDSM Directive and the Digital Services Act}, author = {Senftleben, M. and Quintais, J. and Meiring, A.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4421150}, year = {}, date = {DATE ERROR: pub_date = }, abstract = {With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach. Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.}, keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Content moderation, Copyright, derivative works, discrimination, Freedom of expression, Human rights, liability, user-generated content}, }

SLAPPed by the GDPR: protecting public interest journalism in the face of GDPR-based strategic litigation against public participation

Rucz, M.
Journal of Media Law, vol. 14, iss. : 2, pp: 378-405, 2022

Abstract

Strategic litigation against public participation is a threat to public interest journalism. Although typically a defamation claim underpins a SLAPP, the GDPR may serve as an alternative basis. This paper explores how public interest journalism is protected, and could be better protected, from abusive GDPR proceedings. The GDPR addresses the tension between data protection and freedom of expression by providing for a journalistic exemption. However, narrow national implementations of this provision leave the GDPR open for abuse. By analysing GDPR proceedings against newspaper Forbes Hungary, the paper illustrates how the GDPR can be instrumentalised as a SLAPP strategy. As European anti-SLAPP initiatives are finetuned, abusive GDPR proceedings need to be recognised as emerging forms of SLAPPs, requiring more attention to inadequate engagement with European freedom of expression standards in national implementations of the GDPR, data protection authorities’ role in facilitating SLAPPs, and the chilling effects of GDPR sanctions.

Data protection, Freedom of expression, GDPR, journalistic exemption, SLAPPS

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {SLAPPed by the GDPR: protecting public interest journalism in the face of GDPR-based strategic litigation against public participation}, author = {Rucz, M.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2022.2129614}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-10-10}, journal = {Journal of Media Law}, volume = {14}, issue = {2}, pages = {378-405}, abstract = {Strategic litigation against public participation is a threat to public interest journalism. Although typically a defamation claim underpins a SLAPP, the GDPR may serve as an alternative basis. This paper explores how public interest journalism is protected, and could be better protected, from abusive GDPR proceedings. The GDPR addresses the tension between data protection and freedom of expression by providing for a journalistic exemption. However, narrow national implementations of this provision leave the GDPR open for abuse. By analysing GDPR proceedings against newspaper Forbes Hungary, the paper illustrates how the GDPR can be instrumentalised as a SLAPP strategy. As European anti-SLAPP initiatives are finetuned, abusive GDPR proceedings need to be recognised as emerging forms of SLAPPs, requiring more attention to inadequate engagement with European freedom of expression standards in national implementations of the GDPR, data protection authorities’ role in facilitating SLAPPs, and the chilling effects of GDPR sanctions.}, keywords = {Data protection, Freedom of expression, GDPR, journalistic exemption, SLAPPS}, }