The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights external link

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 16, num: 3, pp: 213-225, 2021

Abstract

On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated. This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling. This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).

Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online

Bibtex

Article{QuintaisJutte2021, title = {The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3775599}, doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab040}, year = {0218}, date = {2021-02-18}, journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {213-225}, abstract = {On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated. This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling. This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).}, keywords = {Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online}, }

From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test external link

Abstract

In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.

access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement

Bibtex

Chapter{Senftleben2020b, title = {From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test}, author = {Senftleben, M.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576019}, year = {0416}, date = {2020-04-16}, abstract = {In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.}, keywords = {access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement}, }

Advocate General Turns down the Music – Sampling Is Not a Fundamental Right under EU Copyright Law external link

Jütte, B. & Quintais, J.
European Intellectual Property Review , vol. 41, num: 10, pp: 654-657, 2019

Abstract

In his Opinion in Pelham (C-467/17) Advocate General Szpunar suggests that the use of samples from sound recordings is not permitted under the European copyright rules. While applying an extensive interpretation of the scope of the rights of phonogram producers, he rejects an extensive interpretation of the quotation exception and limits the role of fundamental rights as external checks to copyright law. Despite its merits, there are key aspects of the Opinion that raise concerns: a too broad interpretation of the reproduction right; and an unduly strict view of copyright exceptions – especially quotation – and the role of fundamental rights in shaping the scope of copyright protection. On those points, we suggest that the Court does not follow the Opinion.

Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, limitations and exceptions, music sampling

Bibtex

Article{Jütte2019, title = {Advocate General Turns down the Music – Sampling Is Not a Fundamental Right under EU Copyright Law}, author = {Jütte, B. and Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3377205}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-05-09}, journal = {European Intellectual Property Review }, volume = {41}, number = {10}, pages = {654-657}, abstract = {In his Opinion in Pelham (C-467/17) Advocate General Szpunar suggests that the use of samples from sound recordings is not permitted under the European copyright rules. While applying an extensive interpretation of the scope of the rights of phonogram producers, he rejects an extensive interpretation of the quotation exception and limits the role of fundamental rights as external checks to copyright law. Despite its merits, there are key aspects of the Opinion that raise concerns: a too broad interpretation of the reproduction right; and an unduly strict view of copyright exceptions – especially quotation – and the role of fundamental rights in shaping the scope of copyright protection. On those points, we suggest that the Court does not follow the Opinion.}, keywords = {Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, limitations and exceptions, music sampling}, }