Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 14 juni 2013 (Cruijff / Tirion Uitgevers & De Jong) external link

NJ, num: 13, pp: 1273-1308., 2015

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Case note{nokey, title = {Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 14 juni 2013 (Cruijff / Tirion Uitgevers & De Jong)}, author = {Hugenholtz, P.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1523.pdf}, year = {0324}, date = {2015-03-24}, journal = {NJ}, number = {13}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }

The digitisation of cultural heritage: originality, derivative works and (non) original photographs external link

pp: 70 p., 2015

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the legal consequences of the digitisation of cultural heritage institutions' archives and in particular to establish whether digitisation processes involve the originality required to trigger new copyright or copyright-related protection.<br /> As the European Commission and many MS reported, copyright and in particular "photographers rights" are cause of legal uncertainty during digitisation processes. A major role in this legally uncertain field is played by the standard of originality which is one of the main requirements for copyright protection. Only when a subject matter achieves the requested level of originality, it can be considered a work of authorship. Therefore, a first key issue analysed in this study is whether – and under which conditions – digitisation activities can be considered to be original enough as to constitute works (usually a photographic work) in their own right. A second element of uncertainty is connected with the type of work eventually created by acts of digitisation. If the process of digitisation of a (protected) work can be considered authorial, then the resulting work will be a derivative composed by two works: the original work digitally reproduced and the – probably – photographic work reproducing it. Finally, a third element of uncertainty is found in the protection afforded to "other photographs" by the last sentence of Art. 6 Term Directive and implemented in a handful of European countries.<br /> Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows: Part I is dedicated to the analysis of copyright law key concepts such as the originality standard, the definition of derivative works and the forms of protection available in cases of digital (or film-based) representations of objects (photographs). The second part of the study is devoted to a survey of a selection of EU Member States in an attempt to verify how the general concepts identified in Part I are applied by national legislatures and courts. The selected countries are Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and the UK. The country analysis fulfils a double function: on the one hand it provides a specific overview of the national implementation of the solutions found at international and EU level. On the other hand, it constitutes the only possible approach in order to analyse the protection afforded by some MS to those "other photographs" (also called non original photographs or mere/simple photographs) provided for by the last sentence of Art. 6 Copyright Term Directive. Part III presents some conclusions and recommendations for cultural heritage institutions and for legislatures.<br />  

Auteursrecht, cultural heritage, derivative works, EU copyright law, Intellectuele eigendom, non original photographs, originality, photographic works, right to adaptation

Bibtex

Report{nokey, title = {The digitisation of cultural heritage: originality, derivative works and (non) original photographs}, author = {Margoni, T.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1507.pdf}, year = {0303}, date = {2015-03-03}, abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to explore the legal consequences of the digitisation of cultural heritage institutions\' archives and in particular to establish whether digitisation processes involve the originality required to trigger new copyright or copyright-related protection.<br /> As the European Commission and many MS reported, copyright and in particular "photographers rights" are cause of legal uncertainty during digitisation processes. A major role in this legally uncertain field is played by the standard of originality which is one of the main requirements for copyright protection. Only when a subject matter achieves the requested level of originality, it can be considered a work of authorship. Therefore, a first key issue analysed in this study is whether – and under which conditions – digitisation activities can be considered to be original enough as to constitute works (usually a photographic work) in their own right. A second element of uncertainty is connected with the type of work eventually created by acts of digitisation. If the process of digitisation of a (protected) work can be considered authorial, then the resulting work will be a derivative composed by two works: the original work digitally reproduced and the – probably – photographic work reproducing it. Finally, a third element of uncertainty is found in the protection afforded to "other photographs" by the last sentence of Art. 6 Term Directive and implemented in a handful of European countries.<br /> Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows: Part I is dedicated to the analysis of copyright law key concepts such as the originality standard, the definition of derivative works and the forms of protection available in cases of digital (or film-based) representations of objects (photographs). The second part of the study is devoted to a survey of a selection of EU Member States in an attempt to verify how the general concepts identified in Part I are applied by national legislatures and courts. The selected countries are Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and the UK. The country analysis fulfils a double function: on the one hand it provides a specific overview of the national implementation of the solutions found at international and EU level. On the other hand, it constitutes the only possible approach in order to analyse the protection afforded by some MS to those "other photographs" (also called non original photographs or mere/simple photographs) provided for by the last sentence of Art. 6 Copyright Term Directive. Part III presents some conclusions and recommendations for cultural heritage institutions and for legislatures.<br />  }, keywords = {Auteursrecht, cultural heritage, derivative works, EU copyright law, Intellectuele eigendom, non original photographs, originality, photographic works, right to adaptation}, }

Empirical Evidence for Policy in Telecommunication, Copyright & Broadcasting external link

Vossiuspers UvA / Amsterdam University Press, 0226, pp: 287 p., ISBN: 9789056297602

Abstract

This dissertation contains nine articles with an empirical focus in copyright, telecommunication, and broadcasting. These articles address different research questions and employ a variety of methodological approaches. They all share an economic foundation and the aim to contribute to evidence based policymaking in the field of information law. Topics covered range from the welfare effects of illegal downloading, to those of public television; from the effectiveness of blocking access to The Pirate Bay to stop consumers from illegal downloading, to the effect of adequate legal online services on illegal downloading; from fixed price regulation for e-books, to text and video relay services to enable the hearing impaired to use telephony services; from the valuation of commercial radio licenses, to setting renewal fees for telecommunication spectrum based on an auction. Using these nine articles as case studies, the role and impact of economic evidence for policymaking in the field of information law is investigated. It is concluded that this role is positive rather than normative: legal or social norms maintain the upper hand as guiding principles for policy, more than the economic goal of welfare maximization. However, this does not by any means render economic analysis useless. Increasingly, politicians, judges and stakeholders require economic analysis and economic evidence to make
informed decisions about new policy measures, to make optimal decisions within existing legal boundaries and to fathom the consequences of proposed legal interventions. Without empirical evidence they may simply assume the effects of a policy measure as an article of faith.

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Book{nokey, title = {Empirical Evidence for Policy in Telecommunication, Copyright & Broadcasting}, author = {Poort, J.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1504.pdf}, year = {0226}, date = {2015-02-26}, abstract = {This dissertation contains nine articles with an empirical focus in copyright, telecommunication, and broadcasting. These articles address different research questions and employ a variety of methodological approaches. They all share an economic foundation and the aim to contribute to evidence based policymaking in the field of information law. Topics covered range from the welfare effects of illegal downloading, to those of public television; from the effectiveness of blocking access to The Pirate Bay to stop consumers from illegal downloading, to the effect of adequate legal online services on illegal downloading; from fixed price regulation for e-books, to text and video relay services to enable the hearing impaired to use telephony services; from the valuation of commercial radio licenses, to setting renewal fees for telecommunication spectrum based on an auction. Using these nine articles as case studies, the role and impact of economic evidence for policymaking in the field of information law is investigated. It is concluded that this role is positive rather than normative: legal or social norms maintain the upper hand as guiding principles for policy, more than the economic goal of welfare maximization. However, this does not by any means render economic analysis useless. Increasingly, politicians, judges and stakeholders require economic analysis and economic evidence to make informed decisions about new policy measures, to make optimal decisions within existing legal boundaries and to fathom the consequences of proposed legal interventions. Without empirical evidence they may simply assume the effects of a policy measure as an article of faith.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }

Copyright, technology and the exploitation of audiovisual works in the EU external link

IRIS Plus, num: 4, pp: 9-24., 2014

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Copyright, technology and the exploitation of audiovisual works in the EU}, author = {Guibault, L. and Quintais, J.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1488.pdf}, year = {1101}, date = {2014-11-01}, journal = {IRIS Plus}, number = {4}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }

Annotatie bij Rb. Amsterdam, 27 augustus 2014 (LIRA / UPC) external link

AMI, num: 6, pp: 208., 2015

Abstract

Geschil tussen collectieve beheersorganisatie Stichting Lira (Lira) en kabelbedrijven UPC, Zeelandnet en Ziggo (UPC c.s.). Lira vordert een verbod van openbaarmaking door UPC c.s. van aan Lira door de tekstschrijvers overgedragen werk. De rechtbank oordeelt dat die overdracht geldig is en dat voor zover daarbij rechten m.b.t. toekomstige werken worden overgedragen deze voldoende bepaald zijn om te kunnen worden overgedragen. Artikel 45d Auteurswet staat daaraan niet in de weg.

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Case note{nokey, title = {Annotatie bij Rb. Amsterdam, 27 augustus 2014 (LIRA / UPC)}, author = {Kabel, J.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1473.pdf}, year = {0106}, date = {2015-01-06}, journal = {AMI}, number = {6}, abstract = {Geschil tussen collectieve beheersorganisatie Stichting Lira (Lira) en kabelbedrijven UPC, Zeelandnet en Ziggo (UPC c.s.). Lira vordert een verbod van openbaarmaking door UPC c.s. van aan Lira door de tekstschrijvers overgedragen werk. De rechtbank oordeelt dat die overdracht geldig is en dat voor zover daarbij rechten m.b.t. toekomstige werken worden overgedragen deze voldoende bepaald zijn om te kunnen worden overgedragen. Artikel 45d Auteurswet staat daaraan niet in de weg.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }

Extended collective licensing: panacee voor massadigitalisering? external link

Hugenholtz, P., van Gompel, S. & Guibault, L.
2014

Abstract

In dit rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek wordt geanalyseerd welke voor- en nadelen de invoering van een wettelijk stelsel van extended collective licensing (‘verruimde’ collectieve licentieovereenkomsten) kan hebben om de rights clearance van digitaliseringsprojecten van erfgoedinstellingen te vergemakkelijken. Daarbij wordt een vergelijking gemaakt met de situatie waarin collectieve licenties zonder ondersteunende wettelijke maatregelen tot stand komen. De jurisdicties die zijn onderzocht zijn Denemarken, Noorwegen, Duitsland en Nederland.

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Extended collective licensing: panacee voor massadigitalisering?}, author = {Hugenholtz, P. and van Gompel, S. and Guibault, L.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1471.pdf}, year = {1219}, date = {2014-12-19}, abstract = {In dit rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek wordt geanalyseerd welke voor- en nadelen de invoering van een wettelijk stelsel van extended collective licensing (‘verruimde’ collectieve licentieovereenkomsten) kan hebben om de rights clearance van digitaliseringsprojecten van erfgoedinstellingen te vergemakkelijken. Daarbij wordt een vergelijking gemaakt met de situatie waarin collectieve licenties zonder ondersteunende wettelijke maatregelen tot stand komen. De jurisdicties die zijn onderzocht zijn Denemarken, Noorwegen, Duitsland en Nederland.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }

Creative work and communicative norms: Perspectives from legal philosophy external link

Biron, L.
1219, pp: 19-44

Abstract

In consideration of the application of insights from the humanities to the interpretation of core legal concepts in copyright, this chapter examines three questions: first, what is a ‘work of authorship’, and why does copyright law place such a strong emphasis on originality for determining what counts as a work? Second, can and should we modify ‘romantic’ conceptions of authorship, to take into account the various ways in which authorial practices seem to conflict with their highly individualistic and creator-centred focus? Finally, how might copyright law make sense of the various ways in which authorship is collaborative, in light of its somewhat restrictive definitions of co-authorship? This chapter will consider the contribution that existing philosophical literature on the justification of copyright might have to these questions. It begins by outlining three categories that have application to questions about authorship – labour, personality and communication – and explaining a deeper distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary accounts of authorship which underlies these categories. It goes on to illustrate how these differing approaches to authorship can be applied to the three questions under consideration. For reasons of space and practicality, the focus of this chapter will reflect my expertise in Anglo-American copyright theory and doctrine.

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Chapter{Biron2014, title = {Creative work and communicative norms: Perspectives from legal philosophy}, author = {Biron, L.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1469.pdf}, year = {1219}, date = {2014-12-19}, abstract = {In consideration of the application of insights from the humanities to the interpretation of core legal concepts in copyright, this chapter examines three questions: first, what is a ‘work of authorship’, and why does copyright law place such a strong emphasis on originality for determining what counts as a work? Second, can and should we modify ‘romantic’ conceptions of authorship, to take into account the various ways in which authorial practices seem to conflict with their highly individualistic and creator-centred focus? Finally, how might copyright law make sense of the various ways in which authorship is collaborative, in light of its somewhat restrictive definitions of co-authorship? This chapter will consider the contribution that existing philosophical literature on the justification of copyright might have to these questions. It begins by outlining three categories that have application to questions about authorship – labour, personality and communication – and explaining a deeper distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary accounts of authorship which underlies these categories. It goes on to illustrate how these differing approaches to authorship can be applied to the three questions under consideration. For reasons of space and practicality, the focus of this chapter will reflect my expertise in Anglo-American copyright theory and doctrine.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }

Creativity, autonomy and personal touch: A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for copyright external link

van Gompel, S.
1218, pp: 95-143

Abstract

Copyright law’s originality threshold is not a high-to-attain standard. Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms that copyright extends to subject-matter that is original in the sense that it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International, 2009, § 37; Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46; Football Association Premier League, 2011, § 97; Painer, 2011, § 87; Football Dataco, 2012, § 37; and SAS, 2012, § 45) and that no other criteria may be applied to determine its eligibility for protection. In the Eva-Maria Painer case, the Court clarified that an intellectual creation is the author’s own ‘if it reflects the author’s personality’ and that this is the case ‘if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices’ (2011, §§ 88–89). This was reiterated in the Football Dataco case, where it was once more emphasised that, for an intellectual creation to be original, the author must have stamped it with his ‘personal touch’ by making ‘free and creative choices’ during its production (2012, § 38). The meaning and substance of the CJEU’s originality criterion has not yet attracted much analytical scrutiny. In particular, the limits inherent in the CJEU’s originality standard have received little attention in legal doctrine – let alone in court decisions (although that is probably not where one would expect a critical review of the test be conducted in the first place). This is remarkable, seeing that copyright regulates such a wide variety of cultural production and may restrict the use of even the most low-key, routine creations that surround us in everyday life. A more critical and out-of-the-box reading of the ‘free and creative choices’-language suggests that the CJEU’s originality standard may perhaps impose more limitations than is currently recognised in legal discourse. For one thing, authors are of course not autonomous creators who work in a vacuum. Creative processes are contingent on many external factors. Cultural productions are usually made with audiences in mind and individual creators operate within social, technical and institutional environments with all of the attendant constraints. This implies that, in reality, the autonomy of authors to make free and creative choices is often naturally restricted.

Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom

Bibtex

Chapter{vanGompel2014, title = {Creativity, autonomy and personal touch: A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for copyright}, author = {van Gompel, S.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1468.pdf}, year = {1218}, date = {2014-12-18}, abstract = {Copyright law’s originality threshold is not a high-to-attain standard. Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms that copyright extends to subject-matter that is original in the sense that it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International, 2009, § 37; Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46; Football Association Premier League, 2011, § 97; Painer, 2011, § 87; Football Dataco, 2012, § 37; and SAS, 2012, § 45) and that no other criteria may be applied to determine its eligibility for protection. In the Eva-Maria Painer case, the Court clarified that an intellectual creation is the author’s own ‘if it reflects the author’s personality’ and that this is the case ‘if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices’ (2011, §§ 88–89). This was reiterated in the Football Dataco case, where it was once more emphasised that, for an intellectual creation to be original, the author must have stamped it with his ‘personal touch’ by making ‘free and creative choices’ during its production (2012, § 38). The meaning and substance of the CJEU’s originality criterion has not yet attracted much analytical scrutiny. In particular, the limits inherent in the CJEU’s originality standard have received little attention in legal doctrine – let alone in court decisions (although that is probably not where one would expect a critical review of the test be conducted in the first place). This is remarkable, seeing that copyright regulates such a wide variety of cultural production and may restrict the use of even the most low-key, routine creations that surround us in everyday life. A more critical and out-of-the-box reading of the ‘free and creative choices’-language suggests that the CJEU’s originality standard may perhaps impose more limitations than is currently recognised in legal discourse. For one thing, authors are of course not autonomous creators who work in a vacuum. Creative processes are contingent on many external factors. Cultural productions are usually made with audiences in mind and individual creators operate within social, technical and institutional environments with all of the attendant constraints. This implies that, in reality, the autonomy of authors to make free and creative choices is often naturally restricted.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom}, }