Digital fixation: the law and economics of a fixed e-book price external link

International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 23, num: 4, pp: 464-481, 2017

Abstract

Fifteen OECD countries, ten of which EU members, have regulation for fixing the price of printed books. At least eight of these have extended such regulation to e-books. This article investigates the cultural and economic arguments as well as the legal context concerning a fixed price for e-books and deals with the question of how the arguments for and against retail price maintenance for e-books should be weighted in the light of the evidence. It concludes that while the evidence in defence of a fixed price for printed books is slim at best, the case for a fixed price for e-books is weaker still while the legal acceptability within EU law is disputable. Against this background, introducing a fixed price for e-books is ill-advised.

agency pricing, e-books, fixed book price, frontpage, retail price maintenance, Technologie en recht, Technology and law

Bibtex

Article{Poort2017, title = {Digital fixation: the law and economics of a fixed e-book price}, author = {Poort, J. and van Eijk, N.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1586.pdf}, year = {0428}, date = {2017-04-28}, journal = {International Journal of Cultural Policy}, volume = {23}, number = {4}, pages = {464-481}, abstract = {Fifteen OECD countries, ten of which EU members, have regulation for fixing the price of printed books. At least eight of these have extended such regulation to e-books. This article investigates the cultural and economic arguments as well as the legal context concerning a fixed price for e-books and deals with the question of how the arguments for and against retail price maintenance for e-books should be weighted in the light of the evidence. It concludes that while the evidence in defence of a fixed price for printed books is slim at best, the case for a fixed price for e-books is weaker still while the legal acceptability within EU law is disputable. Against this background, introducing a fixed price for e-books is ill-advised.}, keywords = {agency pricing, e-books, fixed book price, frontpage, retail price maintenance, Technologie en recht, Technology and law}, }

Software is ook bij bitcoin altijd politiek external link

2015

bitcoin, politiek, Software, Technologie en recht

Bibtex

Other{nokey, title = {Software is ook bij bitcoin altijd politiek}, author = {Arnbak, A.}, url = {https://www.axelarnbak.nl/2015/05/20/10e-column-financieele-dagblad-machtsstrijd-software-is-ook-bij-bitcoin-altijd-politiek/}, year = {0605}, date = {2015-06-05}, keywords = {bitcoin, politiek, Software, Technologie en recht}, }

Any Colour You Like: the History (and Future?) of E.U. Communications Security Policy external link

2014

Abstract

This descriptive legal analysis maps and evaluates a four decade legacy of communications security conceptualizations in E.U. law and policy, including four legislative proposals launched in 2013. As the first comprehensive historical analysis of its kind, the paper forwards a range of new scientific contributions in a time secure electronic communications are of historically unparalleled societal, economic and political relevance. Five communications security policy cycles are identified, and their ‘security’ definitions and scope are described. These cycles are: network and information security, data protection, telecommunications, encryption and cybercrime. An evaluation of the current E.U. ‘security’ conceptualizations illuminates the underlying values at stake, the protection offered in current regulations, the formulation of six research themes and an agenda for computer science, political theory and legal research. Despite constitutional values at stake such as privacy and communications freedom and a robust computer science literature, the paper observes a deep lack of conceptual clarity and coherence in E.U. security policymaking. It then concludes that the observed conceptual ambiguity has allowed powerful stakeholders to capture, or paint E.U. network and information security policies in any colour they like.

Constitutional and administrative law, cybersecurity, Data protection, encryption, EU law, network and information security, securitization, Technologie en recht, the c.i.a.-triad

Bibtex

Presentation{nokey, title = {Any Colour You Like: the History (and Future?) of E.U. Communications Security Policy}, author = {Arnbak, A.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1421.pdf}, year = {1014}, date = {2014-10-14}, abstract = {This descriptive legal analysis maps and evaluates a four decade legacy of communications security conceptualizations in E.U. law and policy, including four legislative proposals launched in 2013. As the first comprehensive historical analysis of its kind, the paper forwards a range of new scientific contributions in a time secure electronic communications are of historically unparalleled societal, economic and political relevance. Five communications security policy cycles are identified, and their ‘security’ definitions and scope are described. These cycles are: network and information security, data protection, telecommunications, encryption and cybercrime. An evaluation of the current E.U. ‘security’ conceptualizations illuminates the underlying values at stake, the protection offered in current regulations, the formulation of six research themes and an agenda for computer science, political theory and legal research. Despite constitutional values at stake such as privacy and communications freedom and a robust computer science literature, the paper observes a deep lack of conceptual clarity and coherence in E.U. security policymaking. It then concludes that the observed conceptual ambiguity has allowed powerful stakeholders to capture, or paint E.U. network and information security policies in any colour they like.}, keywords = {Constitutional and administrative law, cybersecurity, Data protection, encryption, EU law, network and information security, securitization, Technologie en recht, the c.i.a.-triad}, }

Security Collapse in the HTTPS Market external link

Asghari, H., Eeten, M.J.G. van, Arnbak, A. & van Eijk, N.
Communications of the ACM, vol. 57, num: 10, pp: 47-55., 2014

Abstract

HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) has evolved into the de facto standard for secure Web browsing. However, widely reported security incidents—such as DigiNotar's breach, Apple's #gotofail, and OpenSSL's Heartbleed—have exposed systemic security vulnerabilities of HTTPS to a global audience. The Edward Snowden revelations—notably around operation BULLRUN, MUSCULAR, and the lesser-known FLYING PIG program to query certificate metadata on a dragnet scale—have driven the point home that HTTPS is both a major target of government hacking and eavesdropping, as well as an effective measure against dragnet content surveillance when Internet traffic traverses global networks. HTTPS, in short, is an absolutely critical but fundamentally flawed cybersecurity technology. To evaluate both legal and technological solutions to augment the security of HTTPS, our article argues that an understanding of the economic incentives of the stakeholders in the HTTPS ecosystem, most notably the CAs, is essential. We outlines the systemic vulnerabilities of HTTPS, maps the thriving market for certificates, and analyzes the suggested regulatory and technological solutions on both sides of the Atlantic. The findings show existing yet surprising market patterns and perverse incentives: not unlike the financial sector, the HTTPS market is full of information asymmetries and negative externalities, as a handful of CAs dominate the market and have become "too big to fail." Unfortunately, proposed E.U. legislation will reinforce systemic vulnerabilities, and the proposed technological solutions that mostly originate in the U.S. are far from being adopted at scale. The systemic vulnerabilities in this crucial technology are likely to persist for years to come.

Technologie en recht

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Security Collapse in the HTTPS Market}, author = {Asghari, H. and Eeten, M.J.G. van and Arnbak, A. and van Eijk, N.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/CACM_2014_10.pdf}, year = {1010}, date = {2014-10-10}, journal = {Communications of the ACM}, volume = {57}, number = {10}, pages = {47-55.}, abstract = {HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) has evolved into the de facto standard for secure Web browsing. However, widely reported security incidents—such as DigiNotar\'s breach, Apple\'s #gotofail, and OpenSSL\'s Heartbleed—have exposed systemic security vulnerabilities of HTTPS to a global audience. The Edward Snowden revelations—notably around operation BULLRUN, MUSCULAR, and the lesser-known FLYING PIG program to query certificate metadata on a dragnet scale—have driven the point home that HTTPS is both a major target of government hacking and eavesdropping, as well as an effective measure against dragnet content surveillance when Internet traffic traverses global networks. HTTPS, in short, is an absolutely critical but fundamentally flawed cybersecurity technology. To evaluate both legal and technological solutions to augment the security of HTTPS, our article argues that an understanding of the economic incentives of the stakeholders in the HTTPS ecosystem, most notably the CAs, is essential. We outlines the systemic vulnerabilities of HTTPS, maps the thriving market for certificates, and analyzes the suggested regulatory and technological solutions on both sides of the Atlantic. The findings show existing yet surprising market patterns and perverse incentives: not unlike the financial sector, the HTTPS market is full of information asymmetries and negative externalities, as a handful of CAs dominate the market and have become "too big to fail." Unfortunately, proposed E.U. legislation will reinforce systemic vulnerabilities, and the proposed technological solutions that mostly originate in the U.S. are far from being adopted at scale. The systemic vulnerabilities in this crucial technology are likely to persist for years to come.}, keywords = {Technologie en recht}, }

The Internet and the State: A Survey of Key Developments external link

pp: 42., 2014

Abstract

This paper sets out to provide a concise overview of key developments in relation to Internet-based services that may have an impact on public policies and ultimately on the state itself. It is intended to support the Netherlands Council for Societal Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, RMO) in preparing its advisory report to the Dutch government on how to deal with the impact of the Internet on society and the state.

Technologie en recht

Bibtex

Report{nokey, title = {The Internet and the State: A Survey of Key Developments}, author = {van Eijk, N.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/internet_state.pdf}, year = {0819}, date = {2014-08-19}, abstract = {This paper sets out to provide a concise overview of key developments in relation to Internet-based services that may have an impact on public policies and ultimately on the state itself. It is intended to support the Netherlands Council for Societal Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, RMO) in preparing its advisory report to the Dutch government on how to deal with the impact of the Internet on society and the state.}, keywords = {Technologie en recht}, }

The Governance of Network and Information Security in the European Union: The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) external link

pp: 83-116, 2014

Technologie en recht

Bibtex

Other{nokey, title = {The Governance of Network and Information Security in the European Union: The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R)}, author = {Irion, K.}, url = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2075916}, year = {0102}, date = {2014-01-02}, keywords = {Technologie en recht}, }