Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 18 oktober 2022 download

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, iss. : 12, num: 118, pp: 2088-2090, 2023

Annotaties, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Case note{nokey, title = {Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 18 oktober 2022}, author = {Dommering, E.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/publications/annotatie-bij-hoge-raad-18-oktober-2022/annotatie_nj_2023_118/}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-04-20}, journal = {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie}, issue = {12}, number = {118}, keywords = {Annotaties, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 7 oktober 2022 (X / ROC-Nijmegen) download

Mediaforum, iss. : 1, num: 3, pp: 43-45, 2023

arbeidsrecht, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Case note{nokey, title = {Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 7 oktober 2022 (X / ROC-Nijmegen)}, author = {Dommering, E.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/publications/annotatie-bij-hoge-raad-7-oktober-2022-x-roc-nijmegen/annotatie_mediaforum_2023_1/}, year = {2023}, date = {2023-03-30}, journal = {Mediaforum}, issue = {1}, number = {3}, keywords = {arbeidsrecht, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Polen is plotseling de verdediger van de Europese grondwet. Een beschouwing over de zaak Polen/Europees Parlement: HvJ EU 22 april 2022, zaak C-401/19 download

Auteursrecht, vol. 2022, iss. : 4, pp: 219-227,

Abstract

Dit artikel bevat een inleiding waarin de verandering in de communicatienetwerkomgeving wordt geschetst om te verduidelijken dat het systeem van de e-Commercerichtlijn niet goed meer past, maar waar toch nog dikwijls aan wordt gerefereerd (par. 1). Vervolgens wordt stilgestaan bij de constitutionele toetsing die het VEU introduceert (par. 2). Hiermee hangt samen dat een abstracte constitutionele toetsing aan de beperkingsclausules van het Handvest ingewikkeld is, een aspect dat in deze vorm in het auteursrecht nog niet eerder aan de orde is geweest (par. 3). Dat een dergelijke constitutionele toetsing heel verschillend kan worden aangepakt, blijkt uit de conclusie van de A-G en het Hof, die daarom tegenover de aanpak van het Hof wordt gezet (par. 4 en 5). Het artikel rondt af met een analyse dat de inzet van de zaak is vrijheid van meningsuiting, maar dat het resultaat is meer overheidsinvloed op de filtertechnieken die censuur moeten voorkomen (par. 6).

Auteursrecht, censuur, Grondrechten, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Polen is plotseling de verdediger van de Europese grondwet. Een beschouwing over de zaak Polen/Europees Parlement: HvJ EU 22 april 2022, zaak C-401/19}, author = {Dommering, E.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/publications/polen-is-plotseling-de-verdediger-van-de-europese-grondwet-een-beschouwing-over-de-zaak-polen-europees-parlement-hvj-eu-22-april-2022-zaak-c-401-19/auteursrecht_2022_4/}, year = {}, date = {DATE ERROR: pub_date = }, journal = {Auteursrecht}, volume = {2022}, issue = {4}, pages = {219-227}, abstract = {Dit artikel bevat een inleiding waarin de verandering in de communicatienetwerkomgeving wordt geschetst om te verduidelijken dat het systeem van de e-Commercerichtlijn niet goed meer past, maar waar toch nog dikwijls aan wordt gerefereerd (par. 1). Vervolgens wordt stilgestaan bij de constitutionele toetsing die het VEU introduceert (par. 2). Hiermee hangt samen dat een abstracte constitutionele toetsing aan de beperkingsclausules van het Handvest ingewikkeld is, een aspect dat in deze vorm in het auteursrecht nog niet eerder aan de orde is geweest (par. 3). Dat een dergelijke constitutionele toetsing heel verschillend kan worden aangepakt, blijkt uit de conclusie van de A-G en het Hof, die daarom tegenover de aanpak van het Hof wordt gezet (par. 4 en 5). Het artikel rondt af met een analyse dat de inzet van de zaak is vrijheid van meningsuiting, maar dat het resultaat is meer overheidsinvloed op de filtertechnieken die censuur moeten voorkomen (par. 6).}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, censuur, Grondrechten, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Freedom of Expression and the EU’s Ban on Russia Today: A Dangerous Rubicon Crossed external link

Fahy, R. & Voorhoof, D.
Communications Law, vol. 27, iss. : 4, pp: 186-193,

Abstract

In RT France v Council, the General Court of the European Union found that the ban on RT France in the EU did not violate the right to freedom of expression and media freedom, under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Notably, the General Court sought to apply principles from case law of the European Court of Human Rights and international human rights law. This article argues that there are serious questions to be raised over the General Court’s reasoning in RT France, and the judgment arguably represents a deeply problematic application of European and international free expression principles.

Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Freedom of Expression and the EU’s Ban on Russia Today: A Dangerous Rubicon Crossed}, author = {Fahy, R. and Voorhoof, D.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4322452}, year = {}, date = {DATE ERROR: pub_date = }, journal = {Communications Law}, volume = {27}, issue = {4}, pages = {186-193}, abstract = {In RT France v Council, the General Court of the European Union found that the ban on RT France in the EU did not violate the right to freedom of expression and media freedom, under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Notably, the General Court sought to apply principles from case law of the European Court of Human Rights and international human rights law. This article argues that there are serious questions to be raised over the General Court’s reasoning in RT France, and the judgment arguably represents a deeply problematic application of European and international free expression principles.}, keywords = {Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

In defense of offense: information security research under the right to science external link

Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 46, 2022

Abstract

Information security is something you do, not something you have. It's a recurring process of finding weaknesses and fixing them, only for the next weakness to be discovered, and fixed, and so on. Yet, European Union rules in this field are not built around this cycle of making and breaking: doing offensive information security research is not always legal, and doubts about its legality can have a chilling effect. At the same time, the results of such research are sometimes not used to allow others to take defensive measures, but instead are used to attack. In this article, I review whether states have an obligation under the right to science and the right to communications freedom to develop governance which addresses these two issues. I first discuss the characteristics of this cycle of making and breaking. I then discuss the rules in the European Union with regard to this cycle. Then I discuss how the right to science and the right to communications freedom under the European Convention for Human Rights , the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights apply to this domain. I then conclude that states must recognise a right to research information security vulnerabilities, but that this right comes with a duty of researchers to disclose their findings in a way which strengthens information security.

Communications freedom, Coordinated vulnerability disclosure, Duty to disclose, frontpage, Informatierecht, Information security, Information security research, Right to science, Vrijheid van meningsuiting, Vulnerabilities

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {In defense of offense: information security research under the right to science}, author = {van Daalen, O.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2022.105706}, year = {0712}, date = {2022-07-12}, journal = {Computer Law & Security Review}, volume = {46}, pages = {}, abstract = {Information security is something you do, not something you have. It\'s a recurring process of finding weaknesses and fixing them, only for the next weakness to be discovered, and fixed, and so on. Yet, European Union rules in this field are not built around this cycle of making and breaking: doing offensive information security research is not always legal, and doubts about its legality can have a chilling effect. At the same time, the results of such research are sometimes not used to allow others to take defensive measures, but instead are used to attack. In this article, I review whether states have an obligation under the right to science and the right to communications freedom to develop governance which addresses these two issues. I first discuss the characteristics of this cycle of making and breaking. I then discuss the rules in the European Union with regard to this cycle. Then I discuss how the right to science and the right to communications freedom under the European Convention for Human Rights , the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights apply to this domain. I then conclude that states must recognise a right to research information security vulnerabilities, but that this right comes with a duty of researchers to disclose their findings in a way which strengthens information security.}, keywords = {Communications freedom, Coordinated vulnerability disclosure, Duty to disclose, frontpage, Informatierecht, Information security, Information security research, Right to science, Vrijheid van meningsuiting, Vulnerabilities}, }

Annotatie bij Rb Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Kamerlid / LinkedIn Ierland & LinkedIn Nederland) external link

Computerrecht, iss. : 3, num: 97, pp: 228-230, 2022

Art. 10 EVRM, desinformatie, frontpage, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Annotatie bij Rb Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Kamerlid / LinkedIn Ierland & LinkedIn Nederland)}, author = {Leerssen, P.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_computerrecht_2022_97/}, year = {0616}, date = {2022-06-16}, journal = {Computerrecht}, issue = {3}, number = {97}, keywords = {Art. 10 EVRM, desinformatie, frontpage, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Article 17 survives, but freedom of expression safeguards are key: C-401/19 – Poland v Parliament and Council external link

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2022

Art. 17, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Article 17 survives, but freedom of expression safeguards are key: C-401/19 – Poland v Parliament and Council}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2022/04/26/article-17-survives-but-freedom-of-expression-safeguards-are-key-c-401-19-poland-v-parliament-and-council/}, year = {0502}, date = {2022-05-02}, journal = {Kluwer Copyright Blog}, keywords = {Art. 17, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Annotatie bij Rb. Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Van Haga / LinkedIn) external link

Mediaforum, vol. 33, num: 6, pp: 206-208, 2021

Abstract

Het Tweede Kamerlid Van Haga heeft op zijn LinkedIn profielpagina berichten geplaatst waarin hij de gevaren van het coronavirus in twijfel trok. Het bedrijf LinkedIn heeft eerst een paar van deze berichten verwijderd en daarna het account van Van Haga helemaal beëindigd. In het kort geding ging het onder meer om de vraag in hoeverre Van Haga beschermd wordt door de vrijheid van meningsuiting.

sociale media, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Annotatie bij Rb. Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Van Haga / LinkedIn)}, author = {Hins, A.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_Mf_2021_6.pdf}, year = {1202}, date = {2021-12-02}, journal = {Mediaforum}, volume = {33}, number = {6}, pages = {206-208}, abstract = {Het Tweede Kamerlid Van Haga heeft op zijn LinkedIn profielpagina berichten geplaatst waarin hij de gevaren van het coronavirus in twijfel trok. Het bedrijf LinkedIn heeft eerst een paar van deze berichten verwijderd en daarna het account van Van Haga helemaal beëindigd. In het kort geding ging het onder meer om de vraag in hoeverre Van Haga beschermd wordt door de vrijheid van meningsuiting.}, keywords = {sociale media, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Private censuur door sociale media, Annotatie bij Rb Amsterdam 9 september 2020 (X / Google Ireland & Google Netherlands) en Rb Amsterdam 13 oktober 2020 (Stichting Smart Exit, Stichting Viruswaarheid en Y / Facebook Ireland & Facebook Netherlands) external link

Mediaforum, num: 6, pp: 226-227, 2020

Abstract

In civiele procedures tegen respectievelijk Google (YouTube) en Facebook wordt gevorderd dat de platformexploitanten informatie terugplaatsen die door hen was verwijderd op grond van hun beleid tegen desinformatie. De annotatie bespreekt de horizontale werking van het recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting en maakt een vergelijking met het recht in de U.S.A.

Annotaties, censuur, sociale media, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Private censuur door sociale media, Annotatie bij Rb Amsterdam 9 september 2020 (X / Google Ireland & Google Netherlands) en Rb Amsterdam 13 oktober 2020 (Stichting Smart Exit, Stichting Viruswaarheid en Y / Facebook Ireland & Facebook Netherlands)}, author = {Hins, A.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_MF_2020_6.pdf}, year = {0601}, date = {2020-06-01}, journal = {Mediaforum}, number = {6}, abstract = {In civiele procedures tegen respectievelijk Google (YouTube) en Facebook wordt gevorderd dat de platformexploitanten informatie terugplaatsen die door hen was verwijderd op grond van hun beleid tegen desinformatie. De annotatie bespreekt de horizontale werking van het recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting en maakt een vergelijking met het recht in de U.S.A.}, keywords = {Annotaties, censuur, sociale media, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors: An interdisciplinary exploration external link

Fahy, R., Dobber, T., Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. & Shires, J.
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, pp: 856-877, 2022

Abstract

This article discusses a problem that has received scant attention in literature: microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors. Microtargeting involves collecting information about people, and using that information to show them targeted political advertisements. Such microtargeting enables advertisers to target ads to specific groups of people, for instance people who visit certain websites, forums, or Facebook groups. This article focuses on one type of microtargeting: microtargeting by foreign actors. For example, Russia has targeted certain groups in the US with ads, aiming to sow discord. Foreign actors could also try to influence European elections, for instance by advertising in favour of a certain political party. Foreign propaganda possibilities existed before microtargeting. This article explores two questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors different from other foreign propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe do to mitigate the risks of microtargeted propaganda?

EU law, frontpage, gegevensbescherming, microtargeting, propaganda, Regulering, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors: An interdisciplinary exploration}, author = {Fahy, R. and Dobber, T. and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. and Shires, J.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/MaastrichtJournalofEuropeanandComparativeLaw_2021_6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X211042471}, year = {0125}, date = {2022-01-25}, journal = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law}, abstract = {This article discusses a problem that has received scant attention in literature: microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors. Microtargeting involves collecting information about people, and using that information to show them targeted political advertisements. Such microtargeting enables advertisers to target ads to specific groups of people, for instance people who visit certain websites, forums, or Facebook groups. This article focuses on one type of microtargeting: microtargeting by foreign actors. For example, Russia has targeted certain groups in the US with ads, aiming to sow discord. Foreign actors could also try to influence European elections, for instance by advertising in favour of a certain political party. Foreign propaganda possibilities existed before microtargeting. This article explores two questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors different from other foreign propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe do to mitigate the risks of microtargeted propaganda?}, keywords = {EU law, frontpage, gegevensbescherming, microtargeting, propaganda, Regulering, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }